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Production Sharing Agreements in the Caucasus and Central Asia:  
A Contextual Study of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
Hakan Şahin* 
Abstract 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly formed resource-rich countries have 
each striven to occupy a major position in Eurasian economy. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are 
two of the former Soviet republics that arguably have most successfully realised this goal in 
the petroleum sector, largely by attracting foreign investors. Their success in attracting and 
securing these investments has been dependent on contractual production-sharing agreements 
(‘PSAs’) as well as the implementation of a series of laws designed to protect and secure 
foreign investment. Production-sharing agreements establish the legal, fiscal and commercial 
framework between a multinational oil company and a concerned state with respect to each 
other. This article focuses on the legal and taxation aspects of the PSAs initiated by Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan from a comparative perspective. The article exposes the main legal issues and 
explores the most controversial contractual commitments inserted into this type of agreement. 
It goes on to propose practicable solutions to overcome the outlined challenges and makes 
concrete recommendations to the governments of these states. 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new sovereign states emerged in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Ever since they gained independence in 1991, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan have engaged in close cooperation with multinational oil and gas companies. In 
this manner, the two nascent nation-states have managed to distinguish themselves from other 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. The implementation of a series of laws 
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with regard to the protection of foreign investors has been 
fundamental to boosting the attractiveness of these states to the petroleum sector. Notably, in 
Azerbaijan, foreign investment is supported by a range of laws, such as the Law on the 
Protection of Foreign Investments,2 the Investment Activity Law3 and the Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.4 At present, there are more than 30 foreign petroleum investors 
actively conducting business in Azerbaijan, among which the USA, the UK, Norway, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Japan and China.5 
In neighbouring Kazakhstan, the energy sector, and more specifically, oil and gas extraction 
are a crucial national enterprise in that they form the backbone of the country’s economy. To 
attract foreign investors in the petroleum sector, the state has introduced key new legislation to 
 
* Hakan Şahin is a Lecturer in Law in Nottingham Law School at Nottingham Trent University. Dr. Sahin, received 
an LL. B degree in law from Yeditepe University, Istanbul in Turkey. He also holds LL.M and PhD degrees in 
law from Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge in the UK. He regularly advises state entities as well as private 
clients on a range of issues, energy law, international arbitration, international investment and international trade 
law. He is the author of several published works in the field of energy law and contract law. Email: 
hakan.sahin@ntu.ac.uk University web address: https://www.ntu.ac.uk 
2 The Law of The Republic of Azerbaijan on Protection of Foreign Invesmnets (15 January 1992). 
3 The Law of The Republic of Azerbaijan on Investment Activity (13 January 1995). 
4 The Law of The Republic of Azerbaijan on International Commercial Arbitration ( 18 November 1999). 
5 Nurlan Mustafayev, ‘Production-Sharing Agreements in the Petroleum Industry of Azerbaijan’ (2015) 8(4) 
Journal of World of Energy Law and Business 362. 
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satisfy the contractual needs of the hydrocarbon sector. Notable examples are The Subsoil 
Code, the country’s new investment law, a new tax code as well as a new arbitration law that 
provides a more secure framework for arbitral proceedings. Just as its Azerbaijani counterpart, 
oil-rich Kazakhstan has succeeded in attracting investments from both Western and non-
Western petroleum companies. The following foreign petroleum companies are currently 
operating in Kazakhstan: the multinational oil giants Chevron and ExxonMobil (US-based), as 
well as European firms BG Group Royal Dutch Shell (UK-Netherlands-incorporated), Total 
(France-based), and Eni (Italy-based).6 In addition, non-Western oil companies such as Lukoil 
from Russia and China’s National Petroleum Corporation are also operating in Kazakhstan.7 
PSAs are the standard type of agreement between foreign investors and host states or, more 
habitually, a state-owned national oil company in the petroleum industry.8 This type of 
agreement grants oil companies the right to explore and develop a petroleum field, while 
simultaneously holding them responsible for covering all exploration costs and shouldering 
any ensuing investment risks.9 According to Bindemann, this type of agreement stipulates that 
the foreign oil company explores, develops and produces hydrocarbon, while exploration and 
production costs are divided between the host government and the foreign oil companies. 
Whereas the investor receives a share of oil to recover costs (‘cost oil’) and make a profit 
(‘profit oil’),10 the host government obtains a share of the profit oil.11 
PSAs have been concluded with foreign investors by the governments of Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan in the petroleum sector as means of attracting foreign investment into their 
countries. It is worth emphasising that while the use of PSAs in Azerbaijan is ongoing, the 
2010 Subsoil use law adopted in Kazakhstan drew a line under the continued use of any such 
agreements.12 Notwithstanding that, it was decreed that any active PSAs would remain in force 
and continue to apply to ongoing petroleum development operations in Kazakhstan.13 Put in 
simple terms, this policy update does not challenge the status of any previously signed PSAs 
between national oil companies and international petroleum investors. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the legal and taxation aspects of current PSAs of 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan from a comparative perspective. The article exposes the main legal 
issues and explores some of the more controversial contractual commitments inserted into this 
type of agreement. It then proposes practicable solutions to overcome the outlined challenges 
and makes concrete recommendations to the governments of the two countries. 
 
6 Serik Orazgaliyev, ‘State Intervention in Kazakhstan’s Energy Sector: Nationalisation or Participation?’ (2018) 
9 Journal of Eurasian Studies 146. 
7 ibid. 
8 Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability (OUP 2010) 37. See also 
Kirsten Bindemann, ‘Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis’ (October 1999) Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies (OIES) WPM no. 25, 1. 
9 Hakan Sahin, Host Government Agreements and Law in the Energy Sector: The Case of Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
(Routledge 2018) 12. 
10 Kirsten Bindemann, (n 8) 1. 
11 ibid. 
12 Law No. 291 IV of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Subsoil and Subsoil Use, dated June 24, 2010. 
13 International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), How to scrutinize a Production Sharing 
Agreement: A guide for the oil and gas sector based on experience from the Caspian Region (IIED 2012) available 
at <https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16031IIED.pdf> accessed in May 2019. 
3 
 
2. Azerbaijan: The Legal Regime Governing the Petroleum Sector 
The hydrocarbon sector is not new to Azerbaijan. The country boasts one of the longest running 
and most well-established petroleum producing industry in the world.14 In the second half of 
the 20th century, petroleum production in Azerbaijan stagnated as Soviet oil investment in 
Siberia took precedence.15 Conversely, in the early 1990s, Azerbaijan occupied a central place 
in the global oil industry producing half of the world’s oil.16 The founder of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev established a new PSA model as part of his strategy to attract 
foreign investments into the national energy sector. His policy has been highly effective as 
since 1994 the country has entered into a total of 32 PSAs with foreign oil companies.17 The 
former president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) Sabit Bagirov presented a 
compelling case for the effectiveness of this legislative model. Bagirov argued that, for a newly 
founded state, especially one that lacked financial capital, PSAs were the only form of 
agreement available that could feasibly deliver a return to Azerbaijan.18 
Azerbaijan’s PSAs in principle contain freezing, economic-balancing stability provisions.19 
Generally speaking, these provisions are inserted by international investors in an investment 
contract to ensure that the contract shall not be unilaterally altered or terminated by a host 
government’s legislative or administrative activities. Unlike Kazakhstan, the stability 
commitments covered in Azerbaijan’s PSAs extend to the environment and public health and 
safety. This means that Azerbaijan’s regulatory or administrative activities in the area of human 
rights, health and safety should not have an adverse effect on the economic interest of the 
investors. 
The Azerbaijan PSA of 1998 provides that: 
[In] the event that any Governmental Authority invokes any present or future law, 
treaty, intergovernmental agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes 
the provision of this agreement or adversely or positively affects the rights or interests 
of Contractor hereunder, including, but not limited to, any changes in tax legislation, 
regulations, or administrative practice, or jurisdictional changes pertaining to the 
Contract Area, the terms of this Agreement shall be adjusted to re-establish the 
economic equilibrium of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of Contractor have 
been adversely affected, then SOCAR [The National Company] shall indemnify 
 
14 U.S., Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Azerbaijan, available at 
<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Azerbaijan/azerbaijan_bkgd.pdf> 
accessed in August 2019. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Richard Pomfret, ‘Exploiting Energy and Mineral Resources in Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia’ (2010) 
University of Adelaide School of Economics Research Paper No 2010-16, 6 available at 
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6251053.pdf> accessed in May 2019. 
17 Hakan Sahin (n.9) 155. For further reading, please see Oksan Bayulgen, Foreign Investment and Political 
Regimes: The Oil Sector in Azerbaijan, Russia and Norway, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2010) 93. 
18 Sabit Bagirov, ‘Azerbaijan s Oil Revenues: Ways of Reducing the Risk of Ineffective Use’ (2007), unpublished 
manuscript cited in Aitor Ciaretta & Shahriyar Nasirov, Analysis of Azerbaijan Oil and Gas Sector, 
<https://www.usaee.org/usaee2011/submissions/OnlineProceedings/Ciarreta_Nasirov-Article1.pdf> accessed in 
May 2019. 
19 Fatma Babayeva, ‘Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs): Azerbaijan’s Practice’ (June 2016) 4(3) ENERPO, 
13. 
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Contractor (and its assignees) for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic 
circumstances, loss or damages that ensure therefrom.20  
With regard to the above-cited contract, Cameron asserts that: 
[The] role of SOCAR in the contract underlines an important point. In a number of 
cases the host country’s NOC will play a central role in the operation of fiscal 
stabilisation. It may provide for adjustment by paying any additional taxes out of its 
share of profit petroleum or royalty under a PSA or it may reimburse the IOC directly 
out of general revenues. Under a rate of return system, the NOC could pay from its 
share of royalty and/or excess profits tax.21 
As is evident, this in-built stability provision is, in effect, a freezing clause with economic 
balancing. Traditional stabilisation clauses are designed to protect petroleum investors by 
freezing the legal status quo of the host state on the point of signing. Due to their function of 
freezing the legal regime in the host state, such clauses constitute a challenge to the principle 
of state sovereignty. Conversely, economic balancing clauses do not pose a similar threat to a 
state’s autonomous rule. Instead, they provide a flexible and dynamic contractual framework 
for both parties over the course of the investment project, listing circumstances under which a 
host country may choose to assert its sovereign right to change the economic conditions within 
which the agreement operates.22 Moreover, Azerbaijan has sought to guarantee stability via 
foreign investment law. art 10 of The Law on Protection of Foreign Investment regulates 
guarantees against changes in legislation. As stated by art 10: 
[In] case if in future legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic will worsen investment 
terms, then within 10-years legislation which existed at the moment of implementation 
of investments will be applied thereto. This does not apply to changes in legislation of 
the Azerbaijan Republic concerning defence, national security and public order, 
environmental protection, taxation, credits and finances, public morals and public 
health.23 
In the context of this article, the law provides protection against adverse regulatory changes for 
the 10-year period following the investment. It should be noted that this moratorium has the 
force of law, and thus, is enforceable and has a binding effect upon all Azerbaijan state bodies. 
Art 10 also clearly outlines the guarantees, changes in legislation in the area of national 
security, defence, public health, environmental protection, as well as any acts which may affect 
credits and finances which fall outside the scope of the moratorium. 
 
 
20 The Azerbaijan Union Texas/Commonwealth Production Sharing Agreement, 1998 (art 22/2) in Mustafa Erkan, 
International Energy Investment Law: Stability Throigh Contractual Clauses (The Hague, Kluwer International, 
2010) 205. 
21 Peter D. Cameron, ‘Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for 
Oil & Gas Investors. Final Report’ AIPN, (5 July 2006) <https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-
content/uploads/arbitrationlaw4-Stabilisation-Paper.pdf>, 74. 
22 Klaus P. Berger, ‘Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment Contracts: The Role of the Contract 
Drafters and Arbitrators’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1361. See also Mustafa Erkan (n 20) 
208. 
23 Art 10, Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Protection of Foreign Investments (n.2). 
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2.1 Legal Status of PSAs in Azerbaijan 
The Azerbaijan’s PSA model is unique in its legal process and status. When SOCAR’s officials 
and foreign company’s representatives reach a mutual agreement on a PSA, it requires the 
approval of the president. After this procedure the contract is conveyed to the Azerbaijan’s 
parliament for ratification. When the parliament has ratified a contract, they pass it back to the 
president for a final assent. With a presidential assent in place and after promulgation, the PSA 
is accepted as carting the full weight of law and prevails over all existing or future law or 
decrees, the provisions of which diverge from or are inconsistent with the contract.  
As there is no unique law or regulatory institution that governs such agreements, PSAs have to 
be ratified by parliament. It is noteworthy that the legal framework for the regulation of oil and 
gas agreements is based on the Subsoil Act24 and the Energy Act.25 However, these regulations 
only provide a general framework for energy resources in Azerbaijan. Moreover, PSAs 
received its unique status first in 1994 when the Agreement on Joint Development and 
Production Sharing for the Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli (‘ACG’) was enacted.26 
After the ratification of this PSA from the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, it was 
widely expected that the status of PSAs as law would be a temporary measure and that sound 
domestic legislation would eventually be drafted to govern the terms of energy projects relating 
to the oil and gas industry. Notwithstanding that, in the period between 1994 to 2019 no such 
bill of law has been presented to the parliament, nor has any relevant article been passed by the 
parliament for inclusion in the Azerbaijani Constitution. 
2.2 Taxation Regime of PSAs in Azerbaijan 
Despite the individual nature of each PSA, all current Azerbaijan’s PSAs are similarly designed 
and include many standard contractual clauses. For instance, such agreements mainly comprise 
the rights and obligations of each contracting party; the contract area, the clause identifying the 
development and production period; provisions for the recovery of exploration costs and 
sharing of production; bonus payments and taxation.27 There are, however, peculiarities in the 
taxation-related clauses of such agreements. According to Mustafayev, one of the most inspired 
features of the fiscal regime of Azerbaijan’s PSAs is that it is ‘structurally based on the 
principle of profitability, which is responsive to costs and the recovery of investments, oil price 
changes, the production profile, the timing of payments and contractual stability’.28 The second 
most important feature is that ‘the fiscal system is back-end loaded, i.e. the contractor makes 
tax payments late in the cash flow, which has a positive impact on the economics of upstream 
projects’.29 
According to Azerbaijan’s PSAs, the Republic is the sole owner of all resources and 
installations. However, it is noteworthy that unlike PSAs in other resource-rich countries, 
 
24 Law No. 439-IQ of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Subsoil Reserves, dated February13, 1998. 
25 Law No. 541-IQ of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Energy, dated November 24, 1998. 
26 Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri Chirag Fields and Deep Water 
Portion of Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, dated 20 September 1994. 
27 Deloitte, ‘Azerbaijan Oil and Gas Taxation Guide,’ (2018). 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/az/Documents/tax/aze/TaxBrochures2016/Azerbaijan%20Oil
%20and%20Gas%20Taxation%20Guide.pdf> accessed in June 2019. 
28 Nurlan Mustafayev (n. 5) 372. 
29 ibid. 
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investors in the petroleum industry do not pay royalties to Azerbaijan, although the contractors 
pay profit tax. In Azerbaijan, a different tax regime is applicable to PSAs. If a contractor has 
entered into a PSA in the oil and gas industry in Azerbaijan, such an agreement would define 
the taxation regime for the investor’s business activity. The tax regime for PSAs in Azerbaijan 
is called the Oil consortia. It applies to the contractor and all other project participants of a 
PSA. Currently, all of the PSAs to which Azerbaijan is a party supply a grand total of profit 
tax of around 25% or 35% of revenues, in accordance with rates negotiated when the contract 
was first signed. The PSAs also offer protection against future increases in the profit tax rate. 
Foreign investors are exempted from all the other taxes to which they are ordinarily subject to 
outside the oil sector. 
The PSAs of Azerbaijan include comprehensive tax provisions which are divergent from the 
national tax regime set out under the Tax Code.30  
Azerbaijan’s PSAs also sets out administrative procedure of tax payments. Contractors of each 
PSAs are responsible for only the taxes that are stipulated in their agreements. Furthermore, 
the country’s state owned company SOCAR is the unique authority in tax collection from the 
contractors of each PSAs. The collected tax revenues are delivered by SOCAR to the country’s 
Ministry of Tax of the Republic of Azerbaijan. It should be borne in mind that contrary to most 
hydrocarbon producing countries, the Azerbaijan’s ‘PSA regime does not a envisage 
withholding tax on dividends or repatriation of profits sourced from Azerbaijan.’31 According 
to Mustafayev, ‘the absence of a withholding tax on the repatriation of profits appears 
insufficient and fails to incentivize IOCs to reinvest their profits.’32 
3. Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector: The Legal Framework 
The attraction of foreign investment into the hydrocarbon sector has been a significant focus 
of Kazakhstan’s policymakers ever since Kazakhstan came into being as a nation-state.33 A 
number of significant legislative measures and directives were incorporated into the 
Kazakhstani legal framework more than two decades ago to regulate foreign investment in the 
energy industry. The most significant of these measures are the Oil Law34 and the Law on the 
Subsoil and Subsoil Use.35 Nonetheless, it should be noted that this legislation has been of a 
progressive and incremental nature and has been undergoing a series of liberalising reforms 
over the years by the Kazakhstani government. For instance, in 2010, the country adopted the 
Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use36 which superseded both the prior Subsoil and Subsoil Use 
Law37 and the Oil Law.38 By adopting this law, Kazakhstan sought to increase sovereign 
control over its natural resources and to strengthen the regulations it enforces upon the 
petroleum industry.39 In addition, one of the most significant elements of the Subsoil Use Law 
was that it related to the structure of future petroleum contracts.40 Perhaps the most significant 
 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. (n 5) 374.  
32 İbid. 
33 ibid. 
34 Law No. 2350 of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Oil, dated June 28, 1995. 
35 Law No. 2828 of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Subsoil and Subsoil Use, dated January 27, 1996. 
36 Law No. 291 IV of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 12). 
37 Law No. 2828 of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 35). 
38 Law No. 2350 of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 34). 
39 Kuanysh Sarsenbayev, ‘Kazakhstan Petroleum Industry 2008-2010’ (2011) 4(4) Journal of World Energy Law 
and Business, 373. 
40 International Institute for Environment and Development (n 13) 33. 
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reformatory step taken by the Kazakhstani petroleum sector was the adoption of a new Code 
On Subsoil and Subsoil Use (the ‘Subsoil Code’) on 27 December 2017.41 The new Subsoil 
Code revised several articles in the former statute of Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use dated 
June 2010.42 
In Kazakhstan, the legal structures regulating the development of petroleum recourses divide 
into two main categories: micro and macro governance structures.43 The government of 
Kazakhstan enacts legislation to regulate foreign investment in the area of mining and 
hydrocarbon sectors at the macro level.44 At the micro level, the government of Kazakhstan 
provides contractual agreement frameworks for the governance of specific oil and gas 
projects.45 The Subsoil Code introduces a variety of modifications. For instance, the stability 
regime in the Subsoil Code is one of the major legislative developments. Subsoil use contracts 
related to hydrocarbon is regulated in art 36 of Subsoil Code, under the section of ‘Contents of 
Subsoil Use Contracts’. According to the relevant art 36.7: 
[A]mendments and additions to the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan that 
negatively impact on the outputs of entrepreneurial activities of a subsoil user under 
subsoil use contracts shall not apply to the contracts concluded before making such 
amendments and additions.  
The guarantees set forth by one of this party do not apply to changes in the legislation 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of national security, defence, environmental 
safety, health, taxation, customs, regulations and competition protection.46  
The guarantees established by this article stipulate that subsoil users are only granted 
exemption from parliamentary or legislative changes that would be detrimental to their 
business activities. It should be noted that while the first paragraph of section 7 of the art 
provides narrower stability guarantees to the Subsoil use contractor, the second paragraph of 
this section stipulates several exceptions in favour of the state. These exceptions are intended 
to protect the interests of the country’s national security, defence, environmental security, 
health, taxation, customs and regulations and freedom of competition. It could be argued that 
art 36 of the Subsoil Code is beset with ambiguity as “it does not specify, what constitutes the 
result of the economic activity, who defines that it was or was not worsened and what the 
parameters of worsening are.”47 
3.1 The Legal Characteristics of Kazakhstan’s PSAs 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan is one of the few post-Soviet 
countries “…where production sharing contracts as one of the main forms of contractual 
relations in civil law between the state and foreign investors in the sphere of hydrocarbon 
 
41 The Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Subsoil and Subsoil Use No.125-VI ZRK (the Subsoil Code), 
December 27, 2017. 
42 Law No.291 IV of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 12). 
43International Institute for Environment and Development, (n 13) 20. 
44 ibid 
45 ibid. 
46 Art 36/7 of The Subsoil Code (n 41). 
47 Ruslan Sulaimanov, ‘Balancing State and Investor Interest in International Petroleum Contracts: Comparison 
of Legislations in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Countries’ (LLM Thesis, Central European University 
2011) 54. 
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exploration and development are being successfully applied in practice.”48 Kazakhstan offers 
three types of contractual frameworks to prospective foreign investors, namely concession, 
PSA and joint venture (participation agreements).49 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind 
that no specific legal instruments exist to regulate existing PSAs in Kazakhstan. Rashidova 
notes that, “accordingly, experience of the legal treatment of PSAs in other jurisdictions may 
be helpful in seeking to clarify the situation.”50 
In 2005, a new PSA law was adopted in Kazakhstan.51 This was the first legislation on PSAs 
and it presented a number of conditions and requirements for future agreements. Kazakhstan’s 
PSA model ‘have a civil law character, and so they are subject to the civil code grounds and 
procedures for contract termination as well as the provisions of the PSA law’.52 Although the 
parliament of Kazakhstan issued a new law which applies specifically to PSAs contracted in 
2005, the country decided to discontinue use of such agreements. This was confirmed by the 
adoption of the Subsoil Use Law in 2010.53 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this does not 
mean that existing PSAs will be unilaterally amended or terminated through the legislative or 
administrative activities of Kazakhstan.  
Conversely, existing PSAs remain in force and such policy transformation will not affect 
current PSAs signed between Kazakhstan and foreign investors in the hydrocarbon sector. 
Indeed, Karachaganak and Kashagan, widely accepted as the largest fields in Kazakhstan, were 
developed under the PSA model. The question remains as to why the country decided to 
eliminate the PSA regime, notwithstanding the key role these agreements played in the 
country’s investment policy in the petroleum sector. Campaner and Yenikeyef provide a 
plausible explanation:  
[H]igh commodity prices and the desire to increase the control and involvement of the 
government in the oil and gas industry have impelled the authorities of Kazakhstan to 
abandon the use of PSAs. Constant production delays and escalating costs have certainly 
given the Kazakh authorities a unique opportunity to renegotiate the contract in order to 
gain greater control over the field.54  
3.2. Kashagan-PSA: An Example 
The Kashagan petroleum field was first discovered in the 1990s and keeps the status of one of 
the largest exploited hydrocarbon fields outside of the Middle East. In 1997, ENI-led equity 
 
48 Andrey S. Udartsev, ‘Improving the Law Relating to Production Sharing Contracts in Kazakhstan’, Chapter 15 
in Ilias Bantekas, John Paterson, and Maidan Suleimenov (eds.), Oil and Gas Law in Kazakhstan: National and 
International Perspective (Kluwer International 2004) 189. 
49 See Mark J. Kaiser, ‘A Review of the Oil and Gas Sector in Kazakhstan’, World Energy Policy, Vol.35, Issue 
2 (2007) 1300-1314. 
50 Zoya Rashidova, ‘Legal Nature of Production Sharing Agreements: A Comparison with the Russian Federation’ 
Chapter 17 in Bantekas, Paterson, and Suleimenov (n 48) 216. 
51 The Law of Republic of Kazakhstan on Agreements (Contracts) Product Sharing for Petroleum Operations on 
the Sea, dated June 9, 2005. 
52 Peter D. Cameron, ‘Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for 
Oil & Gas Investors’, Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), Final Report 5 July (2006) 81. 
53 Law No. 291 IV of the Republic of Kazakhstan, (n.12). 
54 Nadia Campaner & Shamil Yenikeyef, ‘The Kashagan Field: A Test Case for Kazakhstan’s Governance of Its 
Oil and Gas Sector’ (October 2008). 
<https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/42/050/42050161.pdf?r=1&r=1> accessed in June 
2019. 
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investors signed a 40-year PSA with the Kazakhstani government.55 The Kashagan field’s 
recoverable reserves are estimated to be between nine and 13 billion barrels of oil.56 The PSA 
was designed in favour of the equity investors of the project and included very flexible terms 
and conditions. The terms of this agreement are not limited to economic arrangements, but also 
provide for the legislative activities as well as regulatory measures for the course of the 
investment project. 
Petroleum exploration activities in Kashagan began in 2000. However, the commercial 
activities of the project had to be delayed a number of times due to unfair taxation terms and 
conditions. Disputes began with the statements of the Kazakhstani government about the 
reconsideration of the terms and conditions of the Kashagan PSA.57 According to the 
Kazakhstani government, the Kashagan PSA “was upset by delays and costs overruns that 
plagued the project since its inception.”58 Muttitt claims that most of the delays and cost 
overruns were supposed to be incurred by the investors, however the ensuing burdens had to 
be borne by Kazakhstan according to the terms of the contract.59 The author ultimately blames 
the fiscal terms of the Kashagan for these delays noting that “the result of fixed economic terms 
is that for 40 years the sharing of revenues reflects the risk, the low oil price and the government 
weakness at the time of signing, in other words, Kazakhstan is locked into the economic 
situation of 1997 for more than a generation.”60 
In September 2007, the Kazakhstan’s lower house of parliament voted unanimously to make 
amendments on the art 45-2 of the Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use.61 This amendment enabled 
the Kazakhstani government to modify or terminate any previously signed contract that might 
pose a threat to ‘national security’ and the ‘economic interest’ of the country.62 New 
amendments enabled Kazakhstan to initiate renegotiation from a stronger bargaining position. 
By way of example, in January 2008, the Kazakhstani government and the Italian petroleum 
company ENI-led project partners agreed to renegotiate the Kashagan PSA.63 Hence, 
Kazakhstan finally succeeded in effectively safeguarding its sovereign rights over its national 
and economic interests. 
 
 
55 KazMunayGas (Kazakhstan): 16.88%; Eni (Italy) 16.88%; ExxonMobil (US) 16.81%; Royal Dutch Shell 
(Netherlands/UK) 16.81; Total (France) 16.81%; CNPC(China) 8.33%; INPEX (Japan) 7.56%. 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/ongc-gets-project-operators-nod-for-5-billion-
kashagan-stake-buy/articleshow/17506284.cms?from=mdr> accessed in June 2019 
56 <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Kazakhstan/background.htm> 
accessed in June 2019. 
57 Kuanysh Sarsenbayev (n 39) 375. 
58 ibid. 
59 Greg Muttitt, ‘Hellfire Economics: Multinational Companies and the Contracts Dispute over Kashagan, the 
World’s Largest Underdeveloped Oilfield’, December (2007) 17 <https://bankwatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/01/platform_hellfire_economics.pdf> accessed in July 2019. 
60 ibid. 
61 Art 45-2 of the Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use, September 2007. 
62 R Kennedy and A Nurmakov, Resource Nationalism Trends in Kazakhstan, 2004–2009’ (March 2010) Working 
paper of research project RUSSCASP (2009) 6.  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=DE73912BC4F36715D742970BC6360C74?doi=10.
1.1.620.4517&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed in August 2019. 
63 David. L., Stern, New York Times, September 27, 2007, 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/business/27kazakh.html> accessed in August 2019. 
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3.3 Taxation Regime in the Existing PSAs in Kazakhstan 
Similar to Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, all existing PSAs include tax stability provisions. It 
should be noted that aside from existing PSAs and subsoil use contracts, other types of subsoil 
use contracts including concession agreements do not include tax stability provisions. Under 
the Kazakh PSA model, the contractor makes a contribution to the state to reflect its share of 
production, along with payment of some taxes and any other contingent payments explicitly 
set out by the PSA itself.64 
Likewise, Azerbaijan’s PSAs, each PSA of the Kazakhstan provides a separate tax regime. 
According to Minnehan65, foreign oil companies were in such a stronger position that they have 
‘negotiated their own tax incentives’66 and that ‘these are not part of the code and not published 
anywhere’.67 For instance, ‘Nations Energy negotiated a three-year grace period wherein it 
initially paid royalties of three percent before they gradually increased to five percent, which 
was far below what Chevron and Hurricane Hydrocarbons were purported to pay’.68 
PSAs have also included advance forms of taxation, in particular bonuses. There are three types 
of bonuses applicable to petroleum development and extraction in Kazakhstan. These are 
signature bonuses, commercial discovery bonuses and production bonuses. It is noteworthy 
that these bonuses are non-reimbursable.69 Oil companies usually pay the bonuses to the state 
at the initial stage of the PSAs’ operation.70 Perhaps, the main benefits of having these bonuses 
are that they help safeguard the national economy against some of the more brutal effects of an 
economic downturn. 
The insertion of a tax stability provision into a PSA signifies that the state binds itself and 
provides guarantees to the subsoil user that any future tax policy or any legislative activities 
with regard to taxation will not affect the subsoil user’s contractual rights, unless both parties 
make a separate arrangement. In other worlds, under the Kazakh PSA model, the government 
affords stability guarantees that the government will not be able to undertake any legislative 
activities which may adversely affect the tax provisions in a PSA. However, it should be noted 
that as a sovereign state Kazakhstan may wish to initiate the implementation of newly-enacted 
taxation legislation in its own economic interests, in which case mutual consent of both parties 
would be required. In cases where the government of Kazakhstan wishes to abolish certain 
taxes or other obligatory payments to the budget, “…due under the terms of a PSA, the subsoil 
user will continue with any such taxes or compulsory payments as stipulated in the PSA 
relevant amendments are agreed.”71 
 
 
64 International Institute for Environment and Development, (n13) 35. 
65 Tom Minnehan is a tax consultant. He was also one of the interview participants in Jones Luong and Erika 
Weinthal’s research project. For further reading, see Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal Oil is Not a Curse: 
Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (CUP 2010). 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid. 
69 International Institute for Environment and Development, (n 13) 35. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
11 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are hydrocarbon-producing states that heavily depend on the 
petroleum sector. In the aftermath of their independence, both countries have managed to 
establish an externally attractive, investment-friendly environment through the legislative tool 
of PSAs. Many oil-producing countries around the world do not have the ability to maintain 
true economic freedom or effectively manage their own petroleum resources. In this respect, it 
is worth questioning whether oil is a blessing or a curse to a healthy development of the budding 
nation-states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
This is not to gainsay that having rich natural resources can contribute to the economic growth 
and development of a country. However, it is worth emphasising that gaining symbolic political 
independence is one thing, while enjoying true economic independence is another. It is fair to 
state that during the 1990s, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had only a feeble hold over the 
management of their own resources. The attraction of foreign oil companies into petroleum 
sectors was seen as a quick solution for their economic development. To this end these 
countries felt pressed to sign up to a number of PSAs with terms that favoured the rights and 
rewards of international petroleum companies and exploited the weak bargaining power of 
these nascent states. 
The most distinctive features of PSA regimes in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are that both 
countries have provided extensive stability guarantees for foreign oil companies in these 
contracts. On top of that, such stability guarantees can be found in the Subsoil Code of 
Kazakhstan and the Law of Foreign Investment of Azerbaijan. 
PSAs include stabilisation clauses which protect petroleum investor’s rights and interests 
against legislative or administrative activities which may adversely affect the terms of the 
contract that the petroleum investor and host government originally entered into. It should be 
borne in mind that a sovereign state is able to make changes to the terms of a PSA subsequent 
to signing, but only with the contractor’s express consent. Although Kazakhstan modified the 
stability tax regimes of existing PSAs through a mutual agreement as well as a revision of its 
tax code, Azerbaijan has not acted according to their national interests by revisiting existing 
PSAs. Understandably, Azerbaijan is eager to be perceived as a loyal and reliable host 
government which takes the principle of the sanctity of contracts seriously. However, receiving 
fair tax revenue from oil profit is an inarguable legal right of every sovereign state. To this end, 
the government of Azerbaijan should urgently modify tax stability provisions in its existing 
PSAs via the renegotiation process. 
Neither Azerbaijan nor Kazakhstan have a specific petroleum law which governs existing 
PSAs. In fact, the government of Kazakhstan issued its PSA Law in 2005. Whereas this law 
was the first dedicated legislative attempt to govern the country’s future PSAs, the Subsoil Law 
2010 confirmed that this type of agreement will not be applied in the future. Unlike Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan has demonstrated willingness to enter into further PSAs with foreign oil companies 
in the future. It is worth noting that this contract type cannot be found in more economically 
developed oil producing states, such as Norway or Canada. With these facts in mind, the 
government of Azerbaijan should seek recourse to alternative contract types for future 
agreements or at the very least implement a carefully crafted petroleum law to govern the PSAs. 
In Azerbaijan, PSAs are regarded chiefly as administrative contracts. When PSAs are conveyed 
from parliament for the presidential assent, these agreements automatically become normative 
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instruments which prevail over other domestic laws. Contrary to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
regards PSAs as civil law contracts. Ironically, despite the agreement’s apparent civil status, 
no single definition for these contracts has been written into the county’s civil code. It can be 
speculated that pragmatic reasons underlie Kazakh lawmakers’ reluctance to draft binding 
definitions of a legal nature for this type of agreement into the civil code, namely the likely 
inhibitory effect this would have on the country’s willingness to enter into any new PSAs in 
the future.  
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have provided stable tax commitments in their PSAs. 
However, unlike Azerbaijan, petroleum investors have found entering into contractual 
relationships with Kazakhstan to be beset with challenges due to the government’s continual 
contract renegotiation requests with a view to inserting tax provisions into existing PSAs. There 
has been an increasing drive in recent years from the government to exact higher tax revenues 
and a larger stake in the profits than the original PSA terms permitted. Multiple revisions of 
the Subsoil Law also attest to this. 
As newly independent countries, both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a number of PSAs 
with foreign petroleum investors in the early 1990s. The PSAs that they entered into provide 
strong stability commitments in investors’ favour. Azerbaijan is likely to continue offering 
PSAs to investors in the hydrocarbon sector. However, Kazakhstani government should realise 
that PSAs is no longer available in the country. Perhaps the main reason why Kazakhstan has 
abandoned the use of PSAs in the future was because of the country’s resource nationalism 
policy. Further research into PSAs may concentrate on landlocked oil importer countries in 
Eurasia and may introduce the question of what driving forces affect geographically 
disadvantaged hydrocarbon importing countries’ bargaining position in PSA negotiation with 
major petroleum companies. 
